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Abstract:	  A	  key	  component	  of	  scientific	  inquiry,	  especially	  inquiry	  devoted	  to	  developing	  mechanistic	  explanations,	  is	  delineating	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained.	  The	  task	  of	  delineating	  phenomena,	  however,	  has	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  analyzed,	  even	  by	  the	  new	  mechanistic	  philosophers	  of	  science.	  We	  contend	  that	  Marr’s	  characterization	  of	  what	  he	  called	  the	  computational	  level	  (CL)	  provides	  a	  valuable	  resource	  for	  understanding	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  delineating	  phenomena.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  Marr’s	  computational	  level,	  his	  dual	  emphasis	  on	  both	  what	  is	  computed	  and	  why	  it	  is	  computed,	  has	  not	  been	  appreciated	  in	  philosophical	  discussions	  of	  Marr.	  Accordingly	  we	  offer	  a	  distinctive	  account	  of	  CL.	  This	  then	  allows	  us	  to	  develop	  two	  important	  points	  about	  delineating	  phenomena.	  First,	  the	  accounts	  of	  phenomena	  that	  figure	  in	  explanatory	  practice	  are	  typically	  not	  qualitative	  but	  precise,	  formal	  or	  mathematical,	  representations.	  Second,	  delineating	  phenomena	  requires	  consideration	  of	  the	  demands	  the	  environment	  places	  on	  the	  mechanism—identifying,	  as	  Marr	  put	  it,	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  computed	  function	  in	  the	  world.	  As	  valuable	  as	  Marr’s	  account	  of	  CL	  is	  in	  characterizing	  phenomena,	  we	  contend	  that	  ultimately	  he	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  Determining	  the	  relevant	  demands	  of	  the	  environment	  on	  the	  mechanism	  often	  requires	  detailed	  empirical	  investigation.	  Moreover,	  often	  phenomena	  are	  
reconstituted	  in	  the	  course	  of	  inquiry	  on	  the	  mechanism	  itself.	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  (1988)	  convincingly	  demonstrated	  that	  scientific	  explanations	  are	  directed	  at	  phenomena,	  not	  data.	  Phenomena	  are	  regular,	  repeatable	  types	  of	  events,	  processes,	  or	  states;	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward	  offer	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examples	  of	  what	  they	  mean	  by	  phenomena:	  “weak	  neutral	  currents,	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  proton,	  and	  chunking	  and	  recency	  effects	  in	  human	  memory”	  (p.	  306).	  The	  new	  mechanistic	  philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  embraced	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward’s	  focus	  on	  phenomena,	  holding	  that	  mechanisms	  are	  identified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  phenomena	  they	  are	  to	  explain	  (Machamer,	  Darden,	  &	  Craver,	  2000;	  Glennan,	  2002;	  Bechtel	  &	  Abrahamsen,	  2005).	  For	  the	  most	  part	  they,	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  Bogen	  and	  Woodward,	  have	  stayed	  with	  textbook	  accounts	  of	  phenomena,	  offering	  as	  examples	  the	  action	  potential,	  glycolysis,	  protein	  synthesis,	  and	  long-­‐term	  potentiation.	  The	  specification	  of	  phenomena	  is	  generally	  treated	  as	  unproblematic—the	  challenge	  is	  explaining	  them.	  Kauffman	  (1971)	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  selecting	  among	  the	  many	  things	  organisms	  do	  before	  attempting	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  do	  so	  as	  that	  selection	  will	  affect	  the	  explanation	  offered.	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  (1993/2010)	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  often	  much	  research	  must	  be	  done	  to	  delineate	  phenomena	  and	  that	  sometimes	  in	  the	  course	  of	  developing	  a	  mechanistic	  account	  scientists	  end	  up	  recognizing	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  different	  than	  they	  initially	  supposed.	  For	  example,	  research	  in	  biochemical	  genetics	  began	  by	  trying	  to	  account	  for	  the	  role	  of	  genes	  in	  generating	  phenotypic	  traits,	  but	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  research	  Beadle	  and	  Tatum	  (1941)	  recharacterized	  genes	  as	  involved	  in	  generating	  enzymes.	  Bechtel	  and	  Richardson	  refer	  to	  such	  revisions	  in	  the	  account	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  reconstituting	  the	  phenomena.	  But	  even	  they	  do	  not	  develop	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  phenomena	  for	  which	  explanations	  are	  sought	  are	  typically	  characterized	  in	  a	  far	  more	  detailed,	  quantitative	  fashion,	  and	  that	  saving	  such	  quantitative	  features	  of	  phenomena	  is	  often	  a	  critical	  challenge	  in	  explanation	  and	  an	  important	  criterion	  in	  evaluating	  putative	  explanations.	  	  	  Insofar	  as	  phenomena	  are	  the	  explananda	  for	  mechanistic	  explanation	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  what	  a	  phenomenon	  is.	  Although	  measuring	  phenomenon	  quantitatively	  is	  more	  important	  than	  mechanists	  have	  recognized,	  not	  everything	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  quantitatively	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  mechanism,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  mechanism	  and	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  evaluating	  proposed	  accounts	  of	  the	  mechanism.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  action	  potential,	  the	  change	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over	  time	  of	  the	  electrical	  charge	  across	  the	  neuron	  membrane	  is	  part	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  but	  the	  temporary	  increase	  in	  sodium	  concentration	  inside	  the	  neuron	  is	  not,	  although	  both	  can	  be	  characterized	  quantitatively.	  Likewise,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  long-­‐term	  potentiation	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  increased	  number	  of	  action	  potentials	  generated	  by	  a	  neuron	  in	  response	  to	  a	  stimulus	  but	  not	  by	  how	  much	  ATP	  is	  consumed	  in	  the	  process.	  Given	  the	  multitude	  of	  items	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  quantitatively,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  be	  able	  to	  differentiate	  those	  that	  do	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  count	  as	  phenomena	  for	  which	  a	  mechanism	  is	  sought.	  	  We	  will	  argue	  that	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  role	  of	  phenomena	  in	  mechanistic	  explanations	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Marr’s	  (1982)	  characterization	  of	  what	  he	  called	  the	  
computational	  level.	  Marr	  introduces	  his	  well-­‐known	  account	  of	  levels	  to	  counter	  what	  he	  took	  to	  be	  a	  shortcoming	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  neuroscience:	  the	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  components	  of	  the	  visual	  processing	  mechanism—the	  properties	  of	  cells	  and	  their	  behavior.	  Marr’s	  objective	  was	  not	  to	  repudiate	  the	  search	  for	  mechanism	  but	  to	  recast	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  tri-­‐level	  framework	  of	  computational,	  algorithmic,	  and	  implementational	  levels.	  Marr	  contended	  that	  "Vision	  is	  .	  .	  .	  first	  and	  foremost,	  an	  information-­‐processing	  task."	  Delineating	  this	  information	  processing-­‐task	  –	  the	  phenomenon	  –	  is	  the	  job	  of	  what	  Marr	  called	  the	  computational	  level.	  The	  algorithmic	  level	  characterizes	  the	  system	  of	  representations	  that	  is	  being	  used,	  e.g.,	  decimal	  vs.	  binary,	  and	  the	  algorithm	  employed	  for	  transforming	  representations	  of	  inputs	  into	  those	  of	  outputs.	  The	  implementation	  level	  specifies	  how	  the	  representations	  and	  algorithm	  are	  physically	  realized.	  	  What	  is	  involved	  in	  characterizing	  vision	  as	  performing	  an	  information-­‐processing	  task?	  Marr	  associates	  the	  computational	  level	  with	  two	  aspects,	  the	  what	  and	  the	  
why.	  In	  the	  introductory,	  "philosophical	  outlook",	  chapter	  of	  Vision,	  Marr	  says	  that	  "the	  most	  abstract	  is	  the	  level	  of	  what	  the	  device	  does	  and	  why"	  (p.	  22).	  The	  job	  of	  the	  what-­‐aspect	  is	  to	  specify	  what	  is	  computed.	  The	  job	  of	  the	  why-­‐aspect	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  appropriateness	  and	  adequacy	  of	  what	  is	  being	  computed	  to	  the	  information-­‐processing	  task	  (pp.	  24-­‐25).	  In	  "Artificial	  intelligence:	  a	  personal	  view",	  
	   4	  
Marr	  states	  that	  at	  the	  computational	  level,	  "the	  underlying	  nature	  of	  a	  particular	  computation	  is	  characterized,	  and	  its	  basis	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  is	  understood.	  One	  can	  think	  of	  this	  part	  as	  an	  abstract	  formulation	  of	  what	  is	  being	  computed	  and	  why"	  (Marr,	  1977,	  p.	  37).	  	  But	  what	  exactly	  Marr	  means	  by	  these	  what	  and	  why	  aspects	  of	  CL?	  Marr	  never	  provided	  a	  systematic	  and	  detailed	  account	  of	  his	  notion	  of	  CL;	  what	  he	  does	  say	  about	  it	  is	  often	  brief	  and	  somewhat	  vague.	  	  Instead,	  Marr	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  computational	  theories	  of	  specific	  visual	  tasks.	  These	  impressive	  theories	  induced	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  research	  into	  computer	  and	  biological	  vision.	  The	  conceptual	  task	  of	  explicating	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  computational-­‐level	  theory	  was	  left	  to	  philosophers,	  who	  provided,	  in	  turn,	  radically	  different	  interpretations.	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  as	  we	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  none	  of	  these	  interpretations	  is	  adequate	  to	  the	  distinctive	  role	  Marr	  envisaged	  for	  CL.	  We	  will	  review	  three	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  accounts	  in	  part	  2	  and	  show	  how	  each	  fails	  short	  of	  what	  Marr	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  in	  mind.	  In	  part	  3	  we	  advance	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  that	  we	  contend	  better	  captures	  what	  Marr	  saw	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  what	  and	  why	  aspects	  of	  CL	  analysis.	  CL	  theory,	  as	  we	  see	  it,	  provides	  a	  formal	  or	  mathematical	  account	  of	  the	  task	  the	  visual	  system	  performs	  in	  the	  actual	  physical	  world	  in	  which	  it	  functions.	  Our	  goal,	  though,	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  engage	  in	  Marr	  exegesis.	  Rather,	  we	  contend	  that	  understanding	  what	  Marr	  had	  in	  mind	  by	  analysis	  of	  CL	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  providing	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  the	  role	  delineating	  phenomena	  plays	  in	  science,	  especially	  science	  devoted	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  mechanisms.	  As	  we	  argue	  in	  part	  4,	  the	  phenomena	  for	  which	  mechanisms	  are	  sought	  require	  formal	  or	  mathematical	  characterizations	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  context	  in	  the	  world	  in	  which	  the	  mechanism	  functions.	  In	  part	  5	  we	  will	  argue	  that	  Marr	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  characterizing	  phenomena	  in	  CL	  terms.	  The	  tasks	  mechanisms	  are	  to	  perform	  are	  not	  simply	  givens	  to	  scientists,	  but	  typically	  discovered	  through	  empirical	  (observational	  or	  experimental),	  inquiry.	  Moreover,	  they	  are	  frequently	  revised	  in	  the	  course	  of	  developing	  explanations	  of	  them.	  	  
	   5	  
	  Following	  Marr,	  we	  will	  take	  visual	  perception	  as	  our	  primary	  exemplar.	  But	  the	  implications	  of	  Marr’s	  approach	  extend	  to	  any	  phenomena	  that	  are	  appropriately	  characterized	  in	  computational	  terms,	  that	  is,	  information-­‐processing	  terms.	  Marr’s	  account	  was	  designed	  for	  neuroscience	  and,	  although	  some	  contest	  it,	  the	  computational	  metaphor	  is	  appropriate	  for	  brain	  function	  generally.	  The	  task	  for	  the	  brain	  and	  the	  various	  processes	  occurring	  in	  it	  is	  to	  extract	  and	  use	  information	  to	  control	  the	  functioning	  of	  an	  organism.	  Moreover,	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  reference	  to	  computation	  and	  information	  processing	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  brain	  apply	  far	  more	  broadly	  to	  control	  processes	  in	  living	  organisms.	  Cell	  signaling	  systems,	  for	  example,	  process	  information	  to	  control	  such	  activities	  as	  use	  of	  different	  metabolites	  for	  fuel,	  the	  repair	  of	  DNA,	  or	  the	  synthesis	  of	  proteins	  and	  researchers	  are	  increasingly	  employing	  information-­‐processing	  language	  to	  characterize	  these	  processes	  (Shapiro,	  2011).1	  But	  the	  activities	  thereby	  regulated—the	  transformation	  of	  energy	  into	  ATP,	  or	  the	  synthesis	  or	  degradation	  of	  proteins—are	  not	  appropriately	  characterized	  in	  information	  processing	  terms.	  Exploring	  what	  insight	  Marr’s	  account	  of	  CL	  offers	  to	  characterizing	  phenomena	  in	  those	  cases	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
2.	  Shortcomings	  of	  Extant	  Accounts	  of	  Marr’s	  Computational	  Level	  (CL)	  	  We	  cannot	  review	  all	  attempts	  to	  explicate	  Marr’s	  notion	  of	  CL,	  but	  will	  focus	  on	  three	  whose	  shortcomings	  are	  illuminating.	  According	  to	  the	  first	  (the	  “standard”	  interpretation),	  CL	  characterizes	  the	  information-­‐processing	  task,	  mainly	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  concept	  of	  information	  has	  been	  employed	  in	  many	  different	  ways	  in	  biology,	  where	  it	  took	  on	  special	  significance	  after	  Watson	  and	  Crick	  (1953)	  used	  it	  to	  characterize	  the	  function	  of	  the	  genetic	  code.	  Some,	  inspired	  by	  Shannon	  (1948)	  have	  treated	  information	  in	  causal	  terms	  (effects	  carry	  information	  about	  their	  causes).	  Others	  such	  as	  Maynard	  Smith	  (2000)	  have	  defended	  a	  teleosemantic	  notion	  in	  which	  the	  content	  of	  a	  signal	  is	  fixed	  by	  natural	  selection.	  Yet	  others	  have	  rejected	  the	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  information	  to	  genes	  as	  metaphorical	  (Griffiths,	  2001).	  See	  (Levy,	  2011)	  for	  a	  valuable	  discussion	  that	  elucidates	  the	  roles	  different	  accounts	  of	  information	  play	  in	  biological	  theorizing.	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intentional	  terms.	  According	  to	  the	  second,	  the	  aim	  of	  CL	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  mathematical	  or	  a	  formal	  theory,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  third,	  CL	  provides	  a	  sketch	  of	  mechanism.	  	  	  
2.1.	  The	  “standard”	  interpretation:	  Specifying	  an	  information-­‐processing	  task	  	  Most	  interpreters	  of	  Marr	  assume	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  computational	  level	  is	  specifying	  an	  information-­‐processing	  visual	  or	  cognitive	  task:	  "At	  the	  highest	  level	  was	  a	  specification	  of	  what	  task	  a	  system	  was	  designed	  to	  perform:	  e.g.,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  vision,	  to	  construct	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  representation	  of	  distal	  stimuli	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inputs	  to	  the	  retina"	  (Horst,	  2009).This	  information-­‐processing	  task	  is	  often	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  input	  and	  the	  output	  representations:	  "A	  computational	  analysis	  will	  identify	  the	  information	  with	  which	  the	  cognitive	  system	  has	  to	  begin	  (the	  input	  to	  that	  system)	  and	  the	  information	  with	  which	  it	  needs	  to	  end	  up	  (the	  output	  from	  that	  system)"	  (Bermúdez,	  2005,	  p.	  18).	  Thus	  edge-­‐detection	  is	  the	  mapping	  from	  representations	  of	  light	  intensities	  to	  representations	  of	  physical	  edges	  (e.g.,	  object	  boundaries).	  Shape-­‐from-­‐shading	  is	  the	  mapping	  from	  representations	  of	  shading	  to	  representations	  of	  shape,	  and	  so	  on.	  When	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  what	  and	  why	  aspects,	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  apparently	  associates	  the	  what	  with	  the	  mapping	  of	  inputs	  representations	  to	  output	  representations,	  and	  the	  why	  with	  the	  informational	  (or	  “intentional”)	  content	  of	  these	  representations.	  Thus	  the	  computational	  level	  specifies,	  for	  example,	  that	  early	  visual	  processes	  map	  representations	  of	  light	  intensities	  to	  representations	  of	  oriented	  lines	  (“edges”).	  	  	  	  Another	  claim	  made	  by	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  is	  that	  these	  specified	  visual	  information-­‐processing	  tasks	  are	  the	  phenomena	  to	  be	  explained.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  information-­‐processing	  task	  is	  “the	  specification	  of	  the	  explanandum	  –	  the	  cognitive	  task	  that	  we	  are	  attempting	  to	  explain.	  Marr	  calls	  this	  the	  'computational'	  level,	  where	  the	  specification	  is	  typically	  an	  input-­‐output	  function”	  (Ramsey,	  2007,	  p.	  41).	  De	  facto,	  most	  interpreters	  think	  that	  the	  real	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explanatory	  level	  is	  the	  algorithmic	  level	  where	  it	  is	  shown	  "how	  the	  brain	  performs	  this	  representational	  conversion"	  (Ramsey,	  p.	  41).	  Ramsey	  continues:	  "In	  this	  three-­‐tiered	  framework,	  it	  is	  the	  middle,	  algorithmic	  level	  where	  the	  CCTC	  theories	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  kinds	  of	  processes	  that	  account	  for	  mentality"	  (p.	  42).	  In	  the	  last	  sentence	  Ramsey	  mentions	  classical	  theories	  (CCTC),	  but	  he	  adds:	  "This	  is	  the	  general	  form	  of	  cognitive	  science	  explananda,	  even	  for	  non-­‐CCTC	  accounts	  like	  connectionism"	  (p.	  41).	  	  	  We	  agree	  that	  the	  phenomena	  to	  be	  explained	  are	  visual	  information-­‐processing	  tasks,	  couched	  in	  intentional	  terms	  of	  input	  and	  output	  representations	  (i.e.,	  edge-­‐detection,	  shape-­‐from-­‐shading	  and	  so	  on).	  We	  also	  think	  that	  this	  specification	  itself	  is	  often	  not	  trivial	  and	  requires	  lengthy	  scientific	  investigation.	  We	  contend,	  however,	  that	  this	  intentional	  specification	  is	  not	  the	  job,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  main	  job,	  of	  CL.	  It	  is	  often	  made,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	  before	  we	  invoke	  CL	  at	  all.	  Using	  techniques	  such	  as	  single-­‐cell	  recording,	  neuroscientists	  had	  discovered	  that	  photoreceptors	  are	  sensitive	  to	  light	  reflectance,	  that	  information	  from	  the	  retina	  arrives	  to	  V1,	  and	  that	  cells	  in	  V1	  are	  sensitive	  to	  oriented	  lines	  long	  before	  Marr	  invoked	  his	  computational	  theories.	  We	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  call	  a	  specification	  of	  a	  task	  in	  terms	  of	  informational	  content	  of	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  a	  “computational	  theory”.	  This	  	  would	  trivialize	  Marr’s	  notion	  of	  CL-­‐level	  theory	  Indeed,	  those	  who	  hold	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  refrain	  from	  Marr’s	  label	  of	  computational	  theory.	  Thus	  Dennett	  who	  associates	  Marr's	  computational	  level	  with	  his	  intentional	  level,	  says	  that	  "this	  specification	  was	  at	  what	  he	  [Marr]	  called,	  misleadingly,	  the	  computational	  level"	  (Dennett,	  1994,	  p.	  681).2	  But,	  of	  course,	  the	  labeling	  would	  be	  misleading	  only	  if	  the	  job	  of	  computational	  level	  theories	  is	  providing	  such	  intentional	  descriptions	  of	  cognitive	  tasks.	  We	  will	  argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  job	  of	  CL	  goes	  far	  above	  and	  beyond	  that	  and	  that	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  misses	  what	  makes	  CL-­‐level	  analysis	  distinctive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Sterelny (1990, p. 46), Ramsey (2007, pp. 41, note 43), and Horst (2009) make similar 
comments. 	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2.2.	  Frances	  Egan:	  Providing	  a	  mathematical	  or	  formal	  theory	  	  Frances	  Egan	  associates	  Marr's	  CL	  with	  "the	  specification	  of	  the	  function	  computed"	  (Egan,	  1991,	  pp.	  196-­‐197).	  She	  argues	  that	  CL	  provides	  no	  more	  than	  mathematical	  specifications:	  "The	  top	  level	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  provide	  a	  function-­‐theoretic	  characterization",	  and	  "the	  theory	  of	  computation	  is	  a	  mathematical	  characterization	  of	  the	  function(s)	  computed"	  (Egan,	  1995,	  p.	  185).	  The	  aim	  of	  CL,	  on	  this	  view,	  is	  to	  specify	  the	  input-­‐output	  mathematical	  function	  that	  the	  system	  computes	  (then	  the	  algorithmic	  levels	  specifies	  the	  algorithm	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  system	  computes	  this	  function,	  and	  the	  implementation	  level	  specifies	  how	  this	  algorithm	  is	  implemented	  in	  the	  brain).	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  computational	  theory	  of	  early	  vision	  provides	  the	  mathematical	  formula	  ∇2G∗I	  as	  the	  computational	  description	  of	  what	  the	  retina	  does.	  As	  Marr	  put	  it:	  "Take	  the	  retina.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  from	  a	  computational	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  signals	  ∇2G∗I	  (the	  X	  channels)	  and	  its	  time	  derivative	  ∂/∂t(∇2G∗I)	  (the	  Y	  channels).	  From	  a	  computational	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  is	  a	  precise	  specification	  of	  what	  the	  retina	  does"	  (1982,	  337).3	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  might	  agree	  with	  Egan	  that	  CL	  also	  provides	  a	  mathematical	  description	  of	  the	  computed	  function.	  Egan	  departs	  from	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  in	  two	  ways.	  One	  is	  her	  insistence	  that	  CL	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  intentional,	  information-­‐processing,	  characterization	  of	  the	  input-­‐output	  function.	  Egan	  (2010)	  cites	  Chomsky,	  who	  writes	  that	  when	  Marr	  talks	  about	  ‘representation’,	  it	  “is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  relationally,	  as	  ‘representation	  of’”	  (Chomsky,	  1995,	  p.	  53).	  What	  is	  being	  represented,	  according	  to	  Egan,	  is	  immaterial	  from	  a	  computational	  point	  of	  view:	  “Qua	  computational	  device,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  that	  input	  values	  represent	  light	  intensities	  and	  output	  values	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 The term I stands for a two-dimensional array (“the retinal image”) of  intensity values 
detected by the photoreceptors (which is the input). This image is convoluted (here 
signified by ‘∗’) through a filter ∇2G, where G is a Gaussian and ∇2 is a second-
derivative (Laplacian) operator. This operation is arguably performed in the retinal 
ganglion cells.	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light	  intensity.	  The	  computational	  theory	  characterizes	  the	  visual	  filter	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  well	  understood	  class	  of	  mathematical	  devices	  that	  have	  nothing	  essentially	  to	  do	  with	  the	  transduction	  of	  light”	  (Egan,	  2010,	  p.	  255).	  We	  invoke	  the	  representational	  content	  only	  after	  the	  computational-­‐level	  theory	  has	  accomplished	  its	  task	  of	  specifying	  the	  mathematical	  function.	  The	  cognitive,	  intentional,	  characterization	  is	  what	  Egan	  terms	  a	  gloss	  on	  the	  mathematical	  characterization	  provided	  by	  the	  computational	  theory.	  This	  intentional	  characterization	  “forms	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  abstract,	  mathematical	  characterization	  that	  constitutes	  the	  explanatory	  core	  of	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  intentionally	  characterized	  pre-­‐theoretic	  explananda	  that	  define	  the	  theory’s	  cognitive	  domain”	  (pp.	  256-­‐257).4	  	  The	  other	  departure	  from	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  last	  sentence	  cited.	  According	  to	  Egan,	  CL	  is	  a	  mathematical	  theory	  whose	  aim	  is	  
explanatory.	  What	  it	  explains	  is	  the	  intentional,	  information-­‐processing,	  characterization	  of	  the	  function	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  performs.	  Thus,	  Egan	  agrees	  with	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  as	  to	  the	  need	  for	  such	  an	  intentional,	  information-­‐processing	  account.	  She	  contends,	  however,	  that	  this	  characterization	  is	  pre-­‐theoretic	  and	  so	  does	  not	  constitute	  part	  of	  the	  computational	  theory.	  The	  computational	  theory,	  which	  consists	  solely	  of	  mathematical	  descriptions,	  aims	  to	  
explain	  this	  pre-­‐theoretic	  explananda.	  That	  the	  early	  visual	  system	  computes	  the	  
∇2G∗I	  operations	  explains	  how	  it	  performs	  edge-­‐detection.	  The	  explanation	  (presumably)	  is	  that	  the	  system	  detects	  edges	  by	  detecting	  the	  zero-­‐crossings	  generated	  by	  the	  second-­‐derivative	  filters	  ∇2G∗I	  (where	  Gaussians	  are	  used	  at	  different	  scales).	  	  	  We	  think	  that	  Egan	  captures	  very	  well	  the	  way	  Marr	  characterizes	  the	  what	  aspect	  of	  CL.	  The	  job	  of	  this	  element	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  precise	  specification	  of	  what	  the	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Egan’s	  main	  motivation	  here	  is	  avoiding	  a	  context-­‐dependent	  individuation	  of	  computational	  states;	  see	  Shagrir	  (2001)	  for	  discussion.	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does,	  and	  the	  precise	  specification	  of	  what	  the	  retina	  does	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  formula	  ∇2G*I.	  However,	  Egan	  downplays	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  another	  component	  to	  CL,	  namely,	  the	  why	  aspect.	  When	  Marr	  says	  “from	  a	  computational	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  is	  a	  precise	  specification	  of	  what	  the	  retina	  does,”	  he	  refers	  to	  what	  the	  retina	  does,	  not	  to	  the	  why.	  After	  characterizing	  what	  early	  visual	  processes	  do,	  Marr	  says	  that	  “the	  term	  edge	  has	  a	  partly	  physical	  meaning	  –	  it	  makes	  us	  think	  of	  a	  real	  physical	  boundary,	  for	  example”	  (p.	  68).	  And,	  he	  adds,	  “all	  we	  have	  discussed	  so	  far	  are	  the	  zero	  values	  of	  a	  set	  of	  roughly	  band-­‐pass	  second-­‐derivative	  filters.	  We	  have	  no	  right	  to	  call	  these	  edges,	  or,	  if	  we	  do	  have	  a	  right,	  then	  we	  must	  say	  so	  and	  why”	  (p.	  	  68).	  So	  it	  seems	  that	  Marr	  thinks	  that	  CL	  has	  to	  cover	  another	  aspect,	  beyond	  providing	  mathematical	  characterizations.	  	  	  
2.3.	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver:	  CL	  as	  a	  sketch	  of	  mechanism	  	  In	  a	  recent	  paper	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver	  (2011)	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  best	  to	  conceive	  Marr’s	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels	  as	  sketches	  of	  mechanism.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  two	  levels	  are	  not	  levels	  of	  mechanisms	  “because	  they	  do	  not	  describe	  component/sub-­‐component	  relations”	  (p.	  303).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  two	  levels	  “constrain	  the	  range	  of	  components	  that	  can	  be	  in	  play	  and	  are	  constrained	  in	  turn	  by	  the	  available	  components”	  (p.	  303).	  In	  this	  sense,	  of	  constraining,	  the	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels	  are	  sketches.	  They	  are	  placeholders	  for	  structural	  components	  or	  sub-­‐capacities	  in	  a	  mechanism.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  paper,	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver	  say	  that	  a	  sketch	  of	  mechanism	  is	  a	  description	  in	  which	  some	  structural	  aspects	  (of	  the	  mechanism)	  are	  omitted.	  Once	  the	  missing	  aspects	  are	  filled	  in,	  the	  description	  turn	  into	  “a	  full-­‐blown	  mechanistic	  explanation”;	  the	  sketches	  themselves	  can	  be	  thus	  seen	  as	  “elliptical	  or	  incomplete	  mechanistic	  explanations”	  (p.	  284).	  They	  are,	  in	  a	  way,	  a	  guide	  or	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  structural	  components	  that	  constitute	  the	  full-­‐blown	  mechanistic	  explanations.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Kaplan	  (2011)	  advances	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  view	  arguing	  that	  computational	  models	  in	  neuroscience	  are	  explanatory	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  norms	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  We	  agree	  with	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver	  that	  CL	  puts	  constraints	  on	  the	  mechanistic	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  seems	  to	  align	  with	  Marr’s	  methodological	  approach	  (to	  be	  discussed	  below).	  But	  we	  reject	  their	  attempt	  to	  collapse	  Marr’s	  three	  levels	  into	  two	  by	  closely	  intertwining	  the	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels.	  Theirs	  is	  not	  unique	  among	  philosophical	  and	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  cognitive	  science	  in	  attempting	  to	  collapse	  Marr’s	  levels	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Pylyshyn,	  1984;	  Newell,	  1980,	  both	  of	  whom	  collapse	  Marr's	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  level	  before	  adding	  an	  addition	  semantic	  (Pylyshyn)	  or	  knowledge	  (Newell)	  level.)	  But	  this	  approach	  is	  foreign	  to	  Marr.	  If	  anything,	  it	  is	  the	  algorithmic	  and	  implementational	  levels	  that	  belong	  together	  as	  both	  look	  inside	  the	  mechanism	  to	  the	  operations	  that	  enable	  it	  to	  compute	  a	  function.6	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver	  are	  right	  to	  observe	  that	  both	  the	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels	  are	  abstract,	  in	  that	  they	  omit	  certain	  structural	  aspects	  of	  the	  mechanism	  (both	  levels	  are	  also	  abstract	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  provide	  mathematical	  or	  formal	  descriptions).	  But	  Marr	  is	  far	  keener	  to	  point	  to	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels.	  The	  algorithmic	  level	  (much	  like	  the	  implementation	  level)	  is	  directed	  to	  the	  
inner	  working	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  i.e.	  to	  causal	  relations	  (signified	  by	  arrows)	  between	  sub-­‐components.7	  The	  computational	  level	  looks	  outside,	  to	  identifying	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  mechanistic	  explanations.	  When	  referring	  to	  Marr,	  Kaplan	  argues	  that	  "according	  to	  Marr,	  the	  ultimate	  adequacy	  of	  these	  computational	  and	  algorithmic	  specifications	  as	  explanations	  of	  human	  vision	  is	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  well	  they	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  registration	  with	  known	  details	  from	  neuroscience	  about	  their	  biological	  implementation"	  (p.	  343).	  6Thus Marr (1982) writes that “there must exist an additional level of understanding [i.e., 
CL] at which the character of the information-processing tasks carried out during 
perception are analyzed and understood in a way that is independent of the particular 
mechanisms and structures that implement them in our heads” (p. 19), and that “although 
algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more accessible, it is the top level, the level 
of computational theory, which is critically important from an information-processing 
point of view” (p. 27).	  7	  There	  are	  reasons	  to	  reject	  as	  well	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver’s	  contention	  that	  the	  algorithmic	  level	  offers	  only	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  mechanism.	  An	  algorithm	  can	  provide	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  the	  operations	  in	  a	  mechanism.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  will	  not	  specify	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  as	  that	  is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  implementation	  account,	  but	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function	  computed	  and	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  mechanism	  operates.	  Marr’s	  former	  student	  and	  colleague,	  Shimon	  Ullman,	  puts	  this	  point	  about	  CL	  succinctly	  in	  his	  manuscript	  on	  visual	  motion:	  “In	  formulating	  the	  computational	  theory,	  a	  major	  portion	  concerns	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  implicit	  assumptions	  utilized	  by	  the	  visual	  system.	  Briefly,	  these	  are	  valid	  assumptions	  about	  the	  environment	  that	  are	  incorporated	  into	  the	  computation”	  (Ullman,	  1979)pp.	  3-­‐4).	  	  We	  will	  elaborate	  on	  this	  point	  below.	  	  	  
3.	  Recognizing	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  CL	  	  We	  offer	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  Marr’s	  CL	  that	  keeps	  equally	  in	  focus	  the	  
what	  and	  why	  questions	  associated	  with	  it.	  Accordingly,	  we	  emphasize	  two	  aspects	  of	  Marr’s	  CL.	  One	  is	  the	  quantitative	  characterization	  of	  the	  phenomena	  (associated	  with	  the	  what).	  The	  other	  is	  the	  role	  of	  contextual	  or	  environmental	  constraints	  (associated	  with	  the	  why).	  To	  make	  things	  more	  concrete	  we	  focus	  on	  one	  specific	  information-­‐processing	  task	  –	  the	  correspondence	  problem	  in	  stereo	  vision.	  As	  we	  proceed,	  we	  identify	  respects	  in	  which	  our	  interpretation	  agrees	  and	  differs	  with	  the	  three	  interpretations	  above.	  	  
3.1.The	  correspondence	  problem	  	  There	  is	  an	  angular	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  position	  of	  an	  object	  in	  the	  two	  retinal	  images.	  This	  discrepancy	  is	  known	  as	  disparity.	  The	  disparity	  is	  usually	  larger	  when	  the	  object	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  eyes	  (as	  in	  looking	  at	  a	  finger	  touching	  your	  nose)	  and	  smaller	  when	  it	  is	  further	  away.	  The	  visual	  system	  deploys	  disparity	  to	  compute	  several	  features	  such	  as	  depth.	  The	  first	  step	  of	  this	  process	  is	  matching	  up	  elements	  from	  the	  visual	  scene	  –	  that	  is,	  finding	  the	  two	  elements,	  one	  from	  the	  left	  retinal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  then	  the	  implementation	  account	  is	  also	  incomplete	  insofar	  as	  it	  fails	  to	  specify	  the	  operations	  the	  parts	  perform.	  Moreover,	  as	  Levy	  and	  Bechtel	  (2013)	  argue,	  it	  is	  often	  a	  virtue	  in	  explanation	  to	  abstract	  from	  details	  of	  the	  mechanism	  to	  reveal	  what	  is	  actually	  responsible	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  interest.	  	  
	   13	  
image	  and	  the	  other	  from	  the	  right	  retinal	  image	  –	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  same	  object.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  the	  task	  stems,	  among	  other	  things,	  from	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  elements	  in	  the	  images	  and	  the	  multiple	  possibilities	  of	  matching	  elements.	  	  Marr	  illustrates	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  elements	  in	  Figure	  1.	  The	  four	  projections	  in	  the	  left	  eye's	  view,	  L1,…,L4,	  can	  be	  paired	  in	  16	  possible	  ways	  with	  the	  four	  projections,	  R1,…,R4,	  in	  the	  right	  eye's	  view,	  but	  only	  4	  are	  correct	  (filled	  circles).	  The	  remaining	  12	  (open	  circles)	  are	  false	  targets.	  The	  horizontal	  dashed	  lines	  signify	  the	  amount	  of	  (horizontal)	  disparity;	  circles	  (pairs)	  that	  are	  on	  the	  same	  line	  have	  the	  same	  disparity.	  Strikingly,	  the	  visual	  system	  solves	  the	  correspondence	  problem	  even	  in	  highly	  ambiguous	  scenes.	  	  
	  Figure	  1.	  Marr’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  in	  matching	  elements	  to	  determine	  the	  depth	  of	  an	  object.	  	  According	  to	  the	  standard	  interpretation,	  characterizing	  the	  correspondence	  problem	  provides	  an	  intentional	  characterization	  of	  the	  input-­‐output	  description	  of	  the	  task	  and	  exhausts	  the	  role	  of	  the	  computational	  level.	  The	  computational	  level	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states	  that	  the	  task	  at	  hand	  is	  the	  cognitive	  function	  whose	  input	  are	  elements	  from	  the	  left	  and	  right	  retinal	  images	  (say,	  edges,	  bars	  and	  so	  forth),	  and	  its	  output	  is	  some	  array	  of	  pairs	  of	  elements	  from	  the	  left	  and	  right	  images	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  same	  worldly	  feature.	  With	  this	  characterization	  of	  CL,	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  would	  have	  researchers	  turn	  to	  the	  mechanistic	  levels	  of	  algorithms	  and	  implementations	  for	  the	  explanation.	  This,	  however,	  is	  not	  Marr's	  view.	  His	  computational	  level	  –	  both	  its	  what	  and	  why	  aspects	  –	  advance	  beyond	  this	  intentional	  description.	  	  	  3.2.	  Specifying	  the	  task	  in	  quantitative	  terms	  (the	  what)	  	  	  Let	  us	  start	  with	  the	  what	  aspect.	  Marr	  and	  Poggio	  (1976,	  1979)	  provide	  a	  quantitative,	  mathematical	  description	  of	  the	  function	  solving	  the	  correspondence	  problem.	  This	  is	  a	  pairing	  function	  that	  satisfies	  two	  conditions:	  (a)	  Uniqueness:	  a	  black	  dot	  from	  one	  image	  can	  match	  no	  more	  than	  one	  black	  dot	  from	  the	  other	  image.	  This	  constraint	  rules	  out,	  for	  example,	  the	  function	  that	  matches	  L1	  to	  R1	  and	  also	  L1	  to	  R2;	  and	  (b)	  Continuity:	  disparity	  varies	  smoothly	  almost	  everywhere.	  This	  constraint	  rules	  out	  functions	  that	  match	  up	  pairs	  with	  very	  different	  disparities.	  	  	  We	  see,	  then,	  that	  CL	  provides	  more	  than	  an	  intentional	  description	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained,	  i.e.,	  matching	  elements	  from	  the	  left	  and	  right	  images.	  CL	  provides	  a	  quantitative	  characterization	  of	  this	  matching	  function:	  It	  specifies	  the	  (input-­‐output)	  mathematical	  function	  that	  the	  system	  computes	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  matching.	  CL	  shows	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  solves	  the	  correspondence	  problem	  by	  computing	  a	  pairing	  function	  that	  satisfies	  the	  Uniqueness	  and	  Continuity	  constraints	  (in	  short:	  UC-­‐pairing	  function).	  This	  role	  of	  CL	  is	  consistent	  with	  Egan’s	  interpretation	  that	  highlights	  the	  centrality	  of	  a	  mathematical	  or	  formal	  theory.	  It	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver’s	  claim	  that	  CL	  is	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  mechanism.	  The	  computed,	  mathematical,	  function	  constrains	  the	  possible	  algorithms	  that	  the	  system	  might	  use,	  which	  are	  just	  the	  algorithms	  for	  a	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  (Marr	  and	  Poggio,	  1979,	  propose	  a	  constraint-­‐satisfaction	  attractor	  neural	  network).	  And	  the	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computational	  and	  algorithmic	  levels	  constrain	  the	  possible	  “full	  blown”	  mechanistic	  explanations	  that	  can	  be	  provided.	  However,	  both	  Egan,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver,	  on	  the	  other,	  do	  not	  notice	  that	  this	  quantitative	  characterization	  of	  the	  task	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  what	  aspect	  of	  CL:	  What	  is	  being	  computed	  is	  a	  UC-­‐pairing	  function.	  This	  aspect,	  however,	  does	  not	  exhaust	  the	  role	  of	  the	  computational	  level.	  CL	  is	  also	  involved	  with	  embedding	  this	  function	  in	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  perceiving	  subject.	  	  	  3.3.The	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  	  (the	  why)	  	  Marr	  often	  emphasizes	  CL	  is	  involved	  with	  what	  he	  calls	  physical	  or	  natural	  constraints.	  As	  his	  students	  once	  put	  it,	  CL	  includes	  "an	  analysis	  of	  how	  properties	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  constrain	  how	  problems	  in	  vision	  are	  solved"	  (Hildreth	  &	  Ullman,	  1989,	  p.	  582).	  These	  physical	  constraints	  are	  features	  in	  the	  physical	  environment	  of	  the	  perceiving	  individual	  (1982,	  pp.	  22-­‐23);	  they	  are	  not	  features	  of	  the	  mechanism	  described	  abstractly.	  To	  avoid	  ambiguities	  with	  physical	  features	  of	  the	  inner	  implementing	  mechanisms	  we	  call	  them	  contextual	  constraints.	  It	  should	  be	  noticed	  that	  these	  constraints	  are	  not	  the	  informational	  contents	  of	  the	  representations,	  but	  facts	  about	  the	  physical	  environment	  we	  happen	  to	  live	  in.	  	  	  In	  our	  case,	  Marr	  and	  Poggio	  relate	  the	  Uniqueness	  and	  Continuity	  conditions	  to	  contextual,	  environmental	  physical	  features.	  Uniqueness	  ("a	  black	  dot	  from	  one	  image	  can	  match	  no	  more	  than	  one	  black	  dot	  from	  the	  other	  image")	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  spatial	  localization	  constraint,	  which	  specifies	  that	  "a	  given	  point	  on	  a	  physical	  surface	  has	  a	  unique	  position	  in	  space	  at	  any	  one	  time"	  (Marr	  and	  Poggio	  1976,	  p.	  284;	  see	  also	  Marr	  1982,	  pp.	  112-­‐113).	  Continuity	  ("disparity	  varies	  smoothly	  almost	  everywhere")	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  cohesiveness	  of	  matter	  constraint,	  which	  says	  that	  "matter	  is	  cohesive,	  it	  is	  separated	  into	  objects,	  and	  the	  surfaces	  of	  objects	  are	  generally	  smooth	  compared	  with	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  viewer"	  (Marr	  and	  Poggio	  1976,	  p.	  284;	  see	  also	  Marr	  1982,	  pp.	  112-­‐113).	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What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  contextual	  constraints	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  vision,	  and	  of	  cognition	  more	  generally?	  We	  identify	  two	  related	  but	  different	  roles,	  one	  methodological	  and	  another	  explanatory.	  The	  methodological	  role	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
discovery	  of	  the	  computed	  function.	  	  The	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  we	  appeal	  to	  physical	  external	  factors	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  the	  mathematical	  function	  that	  is	  being	  computed.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  we	  derive	  continuity	  (“contextual	  constraint”)	  from	  the	  fact	  	  that	  the	  world	  around	  us	  consists	  of	  objects	  whose	  surfaces	  are	  by	  and	  large	  smooth;	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  image	  is	  composed	  of	  features	  such	  as	  object	  boundaries	  that	  result	  in	  changes	  in	  depth.	  Thus	  overall	  disparity	  is	  mostly	  continuous.	  Or,	  returning	  to	  the	  example	  of	  edge-­‐detection,	  the	  discovery	  that	  early	  visual	  processes	  compute	  derivation	  (either	  of	  first	  or	  second	  degree)	  is	  made	  through	  the	  observation	  that	  in	  our	  perceived	  environment	  sharp	  changes	  in	  light	  reflectance	  occur	  along	  physical	  edges	  such	  as	  boundaries	  of	  objects.	  This	  contextual	  feature	  puts	  substantial	  constraints	  on	  the	  mathematical	  function	  that	  is	  being	  computed,	  i.e.,	  that	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  some	  form	  of	  derivation.	  	  The	  methodological	  role	  of	  the	  physical	  constraints	  is	  related	  to	  a	  top-­‐down	  methodology	  that	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  Marr's	  framework	  (that	  the	  scientific	  investigation	  should	  proceed	  from	  the	  top,	  computational,	  level,	  down	  to	  the	  algorithmic	  and	  implementation	  levels).	  A	  central	  claim	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  practically	  impossible	  to	  extract	  the	  computed	  mathematical	  function	  by	  abstracting	  from	  neural	  mechanisms.	  The	  way	  to	  go	  is	  to	  extract	  what	  the	  system	  computes	  from	  relevant	  cues	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  that	  constrain	  the	  computed	  function.	  The	  contextual	  constraints	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  this	  top-­‐down	  approach.	  	  	  The	  other	  role	  of	  the	  contextual	  constraints	  is	  explanatory	  (we	  note	  that	  on	  p.	  22	  Marr	  refers	  to	  CL	  as	  a	  “level	  of	  explanation”).	  This	  explanatory	  role	  of	  constraints	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  why	  aspect:	  The	  contextual	  constraints	  play	  the	  role	  of	  answering	  the	  question	  of	  why	  the	  computed	  mathematical	  function	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  given	  information-­‐processing,	  visual,	  task.	  Thus	  consider	  again	  the	  correspondence	  problem.	  After	  characterizing	  the	  what	  (what	  is	  being	  computed	  is	  the	  UC-­‐pairing	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function),	  Marr	  asks	  why	  the	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  –	  and	  not	  another	  pairing	  function	  –	  provides	  matching.	  As	  Marr	  puts	  it:	  "The	  real	  question	  to	  ask	  is	  Why	  might	  something	  like	  that	  work?	  For	  the	  plain	  fact	  is	  that	  if	  we	  look	  just	  at	  the	  pair	  of	  images,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  whatever	  why	  L1	  should	  not	  match	  R3;	  L2	  match	  R1,	  and	  even	  L3	  match	  R1"	  (1982,	  p.	  112;	  emphasis	  original).	  Marr	  is	  asking	  why	  should	  computing	  UC-­‐pairing,	  and	  not	  any	  of	  the	  other	  functions,	  provide	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  correspondence	  problem.	  The	  algorithms	  and	  the	  neural	  mechanisms	  that	  underlie	  this	  function	  cannot	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  These	  mechanisms	  specify	  how	  the	  system	  computes	  the	  UC-­‐function,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  why	  computing	  this	  function,	  and	  not	  another	  function,	  lead	  to	  matching.	  	  Marr	  explains	  why	  the	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  leads	  to	  matching	  by	  relating	  the	  conditions	  of	  uniqueness	  and	  continuity	  to	  facts	  about	  the	  physical	  world	  we	  happen	  to	  live	  in.	  Computing	  a	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  leads	  to	  matching	  because	  the	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  corresponds	  to	  spatial	  localization	  and	  the	  cohesiveness	  of	  matter	  in	  our	  world.	  Imagine	  a	  world	  consisting	  of	  objects	  with	  spiky	  surfaces	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  reflection	  function	  that	  is	  almost	  never	  smooth.	  This	  will	  mean	  that	  the	  disparity	  between	  the	  images	  changes	  almost	  everywhere.	  In	  our	  example	  (fig.	  1),	  the	  disparity	  between	  L1	  and	  R1	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  disparity	  between	  the	  between	  L2	  and	  R2,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  world	  it	  might	  be	  impossible	  to	  find	  a	  function	  that	  satisfies	  continuity,	  and	  end	  even	  if	  there	  is	  such	  function	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  computing	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  matching.	  Had	  we	  lived	  in	  such	  a	  	  world,	  	  then	  computing	  this	  function	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  matching,	  but,	  if	  anything,	  to	  something	  else.	  Computing	  UC-­‐pairing	  function	  is	  appropriate	  for	  matching	  in	  our	  case	  due	  to	  certain	  contingent	  facts	  about	  the	  physical	  environment	  in	  which	  we	  are	  embedded.	  	  The	  methodological	  and	  explanatory	  roles	  of	  the	  constraints	  are	  related,	  of	  course.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  contextual	  constraints	  explain,	  at	  least	  partly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  computes	  the	  UC-­‐function	  and	  not	  another	  function.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Marr’s	  methodological	  moral	  is	  that	  we	  can	  deploy	  these	  constraints	  in	  order	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to	  discover	  that	  the	  computed	  function	  is	  one	  satisfying	  the	  conditions	  of	  uniqueness	  and	  continuity.	  	  	  	  
4.	  Insights	  from	  Marr’s	  CL	  for	  Mechanistic	  Explanation	  	  Having	  articulated	  our	  account	  of	  Marr’s	  CL	  level	  that	  sharply	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  the	  algorithmic	  and	  implementational	  levels	  and	  takes	  seriously	  his	  construal	  as	  involving	  both	  what	  and	  why	  aspects,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  mechanistic	  explanation.	  As	  we	  discussed	  above,	  Piccinini	  and	  Craver	  treated	  CL	  as	  offering	  a	  mechanism	  sketch.	  On	  our	  construal,	  CL	  is	  not	  providing	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  mechanism	  but	  something	  quite	  different—it	  is	  characterizing	  the	  phenomenon	  for	  which	  a	  mechanism	  is	  sought	  as	  explanation.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  role	  for	  mechanism	  sketches	  in	  developing	  mechanistic	  explanations,	  but	  insofar	  as	  the	  sketch	  identifies	  operations	  in	  the	  mechanism	  it	  is	  an	  account	  at	  Marr’s	  algorithmic	  level	  and	  insofar	  as	  it	  identifies	  these	  operations	  with	  component	  parts	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  it	  is	  at	  the	  implementational	  level.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  mechanism,	  CL	  only	  specifies	  the	  task	  the	  mechanism	  performs	  and	  offers	  no	  suggestions	  to	  how	  it	  does	  it.	  Thus,	  it	  characterizes	  the	  phenomenon	  without	  trying	  to	  explain	  it	  mechanistically	  (although,	  as	  we	  have	  noted,	  it	  does	  figure	  in	  a	  different	  type	  of	  explanation,	  that	  concerned	  with	  why	  the	  mechanism	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  task).	  	  	  Egan	  is	  correct	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  CL	  offers	  mathematical	  characterizations	  of	  the	  task	  the	  mechanism	  is	  to	  perform.	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  way	  phenomena	  are	  delineated	  in	  scientific	  inquiries.	  If	  they	  weren’t	  delineated	  mathematically,	  the	  quest	  for	  mechanistic	  explanation	  would	  often	  be	  unmanageably	  underdetermined.	  Many	  mechanisms	  can	  perform	  in	  qualitatively	  the	  same	  way,	  but	  quantitatively	  their	  performance	  differs.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  actual	  phenomenon	  characterized	  quantitatively.	  This	  quantitative	  detail	  is	  also	  important	  to	  researchers	  as	  it	  provides	  a	  major	  tool	  for	  evaluating	  proposed	  mechanistic	  explanations.	  Of	  course	  the	  mechanistic	  explanation	  must	  also	  appeal	  to	  parts	  and	  operations	  that	  are	  known	  to	  constitute	  the	  mechanism.	  Yet,	  even	  when	  this	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condition	  is	  met,	  researchers	  find	  it	  important	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  proposed	  mechanism	  could	  account	  for	  the	  quantitative	  details	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  is	  where	  computational	  modeling	  plays	  an	  increasingly	  central	  role	  in	  neuroscience	  and	  biology	  more	  generally	  (Bechtel,	  2011).	  	  	  As	  Egan	  correctly	  observes,	  the	  mathematical,	  quantitative,	  characterization	  (what	  she	  calls	  a	  mathematical	  or	  a	  formal	  theory)	  plays	  an	  explanatory	  role	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  pre-­‐theoretic,	  intentionally	  characterized,	  explananda	  phenomenon.	  What	  Egan	  disregards,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  mathematical	  theory	  has	  this	  explanatory	  role	  only	  if	  we	  embed	  the	  mechanism	  in	  the	  physical	  environment	  of	  the	  perceiving	  individual.	  The	  mathematical	  operation	  ∇2G∗I	  is	  explanatory	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  edge-­‐detection	  only	  when	  we	  relate	  this	  mathematical	  function	  with	  the	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	  magnitudes	  existing	  in	  the	  world.	  As	  Egan	  notes,	  correctly	  again	  (!),	  the	  informational	  content	  of	  the	  cells	  in	  the	  retina	  and	  in	  the	  primary	  visual	  cortex	  have	  no	  explanatory	  role	  in	  CL.	  They	  are,	  perhaps,	  only	  a	  gloss	  on	  the	  mathematical	  characterization	  that	  the	  computational	  theory	  provides.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  there	  are	  no	  other	  contextual	  features	  that	  play	  an	  explanatory	  role.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Marr	  the	  relevant	  contextual	  features	  are	  physical	  (“contextual”)	  constraints	  that	  indicate	  intensity	  changes	  in	  the	  image	  result	  from	  "surface	  discontinuities	  or	  from	  reflectance	  or	  illumination	  boundaries"	  (Marr	  &	  Hildreth,	  1980,	  p.	  187).	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  the	  formal	  theory	  constitutes	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  (associated	  with	  the	  what).	  “The	  other	  half	  of	  this	  level	  of	  explanation”	  (1982,	  p.	  22),	  as	  Marr	  put	  it,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  why,	  namely	  with	  why	  the	  visual	  system	  performs	  the	  mathematical	  operation	  ∇2G∗I,	  and	  not,	  say,	  exponentiation	  or	  factorization	  when	  detecting	  edges.	  	  	  	  What	  makes	  CL	  explanatory	  with	  respect	  to	  edge-­‐detection	  –	  so	  that	  the	  what	  and	  the	  why	  conspire	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  –	  is	  an	  intriguing	  question.	  One	  proposal	  is	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  works	  much	  like	  scientific	  models	  (for	  a	  survey,	  see	  Frigg	  &	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Hartmann,	  2006).	  It	  models	  its	  environment	  by	  preserving	  certain	  relations	  in	  the	  environment.	  CL	  describes	  this	  modeling	  relation,	  explaining	  its	  role	  in	  the	  visual	  task.8	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2	  in	  which	  the	  top	  portion	  identifies	  the	  relation	  in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  bottom	  portion	  the	  operations	  occurring	  on	  representations	  in	  the	  visual	  system.	  The	  dotted	  arrows	  indicate	  that	  the	  representations	  in	  the	  brain	  stand	  in	  for	  features	  in	  the	  world	  itself.	  The	  detection	  of	  visual	  edges	  (say,	  zero-­‐crossing	  segments)	  mirrors	  a	  pertinent	  relation	  in	  the	  visual	  field	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  an	  isomorphism	  (or	  some	  other	  morphism)	  between	  this	  visual	  process	  and	  the	  visual	  field.	  This	  morphism	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  (alleged)	  fact	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  and	  the	  visual	  field	  have	  a	  shared	  mathematical	  description	  (or	  structure).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  visual	  system	  computes	  the	  zero-­‐crossings	  of	  second-­‐derivative	  operations	  (over	  the	  retinal	  pixels)	  to	  detect	  edges;	  this	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  span	  of	  figure	  2.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  reflection	  function	  in	  the	  visual	  field	  changes	  sharply	  along	  physical	  edges	  such	  as	  object	  boundaries.	  These	  changes	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  extreme	  points	  of	  first-­‐derivatives	  or	  zero-­‐crossing	  of	  second	  derivatives.	  	  	  	  	   	  Figure	  2.	  Edge-­‐detection.	  Early	  visual	  processes	  (bottom	  span)	  detect	  "visual	  edges"	  in	  the	  retinal	  image	  by	  computing	  the	  zero-­‐crossings	  of	  ∇2G∗I	  (see	  note	  3);	  the	  second-­‐derivative	  operations	  ∇2G∗I	  are	  performed	  by	  the	  ganglion	  and	  LGN	  cells.	  The	  intensity	  values	  encode	  (dashed	  arrow)	  "light	  intensities"	  of	  the	  visual	  field	  that	  combine	  different	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  reflectance	  of	  the	  visible	  surfaces.	  The	  visual	  edges	  (e.g.,	  segments	  of	  co-­‐located	  zero-­‐crossings)	  encode	  physical	  edges	  such	  as	  object	  boundaries.	  .	  	  Figure	  2	  makes	  clear	  how	  the	  CL	  accounts	  for	  edge	  detection:	  It	  is	  important	  to	  compute	  the	  function	  ∇2G∗I	  because	  that	  is	  the	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  modeling	  idea	  is	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  by	  Shagrir	  (2010a).	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magnitudes	  existing	  in	  the	  world:	  a	  mechanism	  that	  computes	  it	  will	  identify	  edges.	  This	  match	  between	  the	  task	  and	  the	  mechanism	  shows	  why	  the	  mechanism	  succeeds.	  The	  what	  aspect	  provides	  a	  description	  of	  the	  mathematical	  function	  that	  is	  being	  computed.	  The	  why	  aspect	  employs	  the	  contextual	  constraints	  in	  order	  to	  show	  how	  this	  function	  matches	  with	  the	  environment.	  	  	  There	  are	  debates	  about	  whether	  the	  matching	  relation	  in	  models	  is	  similarity,	  isomorphism,	  partial	  isomorphism	  or	  homomorphism.9	  And,	  of	  course,	  not	  all	  mechanisms	  are	  perfectly	  adapted	  to	  their	  environments.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  showing	  that	  cognitive	  systems	  with	  limited	  resources	  employ	  heuristics	  that	  succeeded	  well	  enough	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  but	  which	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  fail	  under	  specifiable	  conditions	  (Simon,	  1996).	  Our	  proposal,	  though,	  works	  for	  heuristics	  as	  well	  as	  optimal	  procedures—heuristics	  work	  as	  well	  as	  they	  do	  because	  they	  capture	  real	  relations	  in	  the	  world	  (between	  cues	  and	  outcomes).	  The	  why-­‐aspect	  of	  CL	  accounts	  does	  not	  require	  showing	  that	  the	  computational	  performed	  is	  optimal,	  only	  that	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  world	  in	  which	  the	  visual	  system	  is	  operating.10	  	  	  What	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  CL	  explanations	  and	  mechanistic	  explanations?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  task	  to	  be	  performed	  is	  conceptually	  independent	  of	  any	  mechanism	  that	  performs	  it,	  including	  the	  particular	  inputs	  the	  organism	  receives	  or	  the	  specific	  outputs	  it	  produces	  in	  solving	  it.	  While	  Marr	  viewed	  the	  algorithm	  he	  took	  to	  be	  operative	  in	  our	  brains	  as	  computing	  ∇2G∗I,	  computing	  that	  function	  would	  still	  be	  a	  task	  for	  a	  perceptual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Swoyer	  (1991)	  talks	  about	  isomorphism,	  but	  others	  about	  partial	  isomorphism	  (French	  &	  Ladyman,	  1999;	  Da	  Costa	  &	  French,	  2003;	  Bueno	  &	  French,	  2011),	  homomorphism	  (Bartels,	  2006)	  and	  similarity	  (Giere,	  2004;	  Weisberg,	  2013).	  10	  Edge-­‐detection	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  isolated	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  CL	  explanation.	  Shagrir	  (2010b)	  discusses	  the	  case	  of	  stereovision.	  Another	  example	  is	  Ullman’s	  (1979)	  structure-­‐from-­‐motion	  algorithm	  in	  which	  the	  3-­‐D	  structure	  and	  motion	  of	  objects	  is	  inferred	  from	  the	  2-­‐D	  transformations	  of	  their	  projected	  images.	  Here	  the	  mathematical	  function	  computed	  reflects	  spatial	  relations	  in	  the	  target,	  assuming	  the	  constraint	  of	  rigidity.	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system	  even	  if	  our	  brains	  failed	  to	  do	  so.	  By	  actually	  computing	  it,	  our	  brains	  solve	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  specified	  by	  the	  relation	  between	  light	  intensities	  and	  physical	  edges	  occurring	  in	  the	  world,	  as	  it	  is	  clearly	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Marr	  does	  not	  offer	  CL	  as	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  to	  mechanistic	  explanations,	  but	  as	  a	  complementary	  one.	  	  Mechanistic	  explanations	  describe	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  nervous	  system	  changes	  from	  one	  neural	  state	  to	  another.	  It	  describes,	  for	  example,	  how	  certain	  activity	  in	  the	  photoreceptors	  (that	  represent	  light	  intensities)	  lead,	  through	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  retinal	  ganglion	  cells,	  to	  the	  activation	  of	  cells	  in	  V1	  (that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  oriented	  lines).	  	  This	  mechanistic	  description	  is	  surely	  an	  explanation	  at	  the	  level	  of	  neural	  circuitry.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  by	  itself	  explain	  the	  information-­‐processing	  task	  of	  edge	  detection	  (This	  is	  perhaps	  what	  Marr	  means	  when	  he	  says:	  "The	  key	  observation	  is	  that	  neurophysiology	  and	  psychophysics	  have	  as	  their	  business	  to	  describe	  the	  behavior	  of	  cells	  or	  of	  subjects	  but	  not	  to	  explain	  such	  behavior"	  (1982,	  p.	  15)).	  This	  mechanistic	  description	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  this	  particular	  neural	  mechanism	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  detection	  of	  edges	  and	  not,	  say,	  with	  the	  detection	  of	  color.	  The	  CL	  provides	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question:	  The	  mechanism	  implements	  a	  certain	  mathematical	  function	  (of	  the	  zero-­‐crossings	  of	  ∇2G∗I)	  and	  this	  function	  matches	  the	  relations	  in	  the	  world,	  e.g.,	  sharp	  changes	  in	  light	  intensities	  that	  typically	  occur	  along	  object	  boundaries.	  When	  the	  CL	  explanation	  is	  in	  place,	  the	  mechanistic	  –	  algorithmic	  and	  implementational	  –	  descriptions	  explain	  how	  exactly	  the	  visual	  system	  computes	  the	  mathematical	  function.	  	  	  	  While	  one	  might	  accept	  our	  contention	  that	  Marr’s	  CL	  accounts	  require	  turning	  to	  the	  world	  to	  address	  both	  the	  what	  and	  why	  aspects,	  one	  might	  still	  question	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  similar	  need	  to	  look	  outside	  a	  mechanism	  to	  its	  context	  in	  delineating	  the	  phenomenon	  it	  explains.	  Isn’t	  it	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  the	  targeted	  mechanism	  exhibits	  regular	  behavior?	  We	  offer	  two	  responses	  to	  this	  question.	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First,	  as	  we	  noted	  at	  the	  beginning,	  not	  all	  regularities	  that	  can	  be	  stated	  mathematically	  are	  appropriate	  targets	  for	  explanation.	  This	  applies	  both	  to	  naturally	  occurring	  ones	  and	  to	  ones	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  experimentally.	  Looking	  to	  the	  task	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  the	  mechanism	  given	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  identifying	  which	  regularities	  require	  mechanistic	  explanation.	  Contrasting	  examples	  illustrates	  this.	  Although	  the	  heat	  generated	  by	  animals	  can	  be	  quantified,	  the	  hundred-­‐year	  effort	  to	  explain	  animal	  heat	  terminated	  quickly	  when	  around	  1930	  it	  was	  recognized	  that	  heat	  was	  a	  waste	  product,	  not	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  that	  animals	  could	  use	  to	  perform	  work.	  The	  identification	  that	  instead,	  adenosine	  triphosphate	  (ATP)	  was	  the	  molecule	  in	  which	  energy	  released	  through	  metabolism	  was	  stored,	  resulted	  in	  extensive	  research	  to	  explain	  how,	  for	  example	  oxidative	  metabolism	  could	  result	  in	  synthesis	  of	  three	  ATPs.	  As	  these	  examples	  make	  clear,	  looking	  to	  the	  environment	  is	  important	  is	  important	  in	  mechanistic	  research	  in	  general,	  but	  it	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  information-­‐processing	  mechanisms	  where	  the	  task	  being	  performed	  is	  an	  important	  guide	  to	  what	  operations	  carry	  information	  needed	  for	  the	  mechanism	  to	  perform	  its	  task.	  	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  the	  world	  that	  both	  sets	  the	  task	  and	  determines	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  mechanism	  in	  performing	  the	  task.	  Part	  of	  the	  investigatory	  strategy	  researchers	  employ	  in	  developing	  mechanistic	  explanations	  is	  to	  identify	  these	  resources	  and	  their	  utilization	  within	  the	  mechanism.	  Mechanisms	  are	  typically	  not	  closed	  systems	  but	  consist	  of	  parts	  and	  operations	  that	  interact	  with	  their	  environment	  in	  generating	  phenomena.	  The	  visual	  system	  is	  an	  example.	  Although	  Marr	  and	  many	  other	  vision	  researchers	  focused	  only	  on	  the	  steps	  in	  processing	  stimuli	  and	  not	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  organism	  that	  determines	  what	  stimuli	  impact	  its	  retina,	  perceivers	  are	  often	  active—they	  move	  their	  eyes,	  heads,	  or	  whole	  bodies	  in	  the	  course	  of	  seeing.	  As	  they	  do	  so,	  the	  projections	  onto	  their	  retina	  change.	  Moreover,	  some	  of	  these	  movements	  are	  directed	  by	  the	  visual	  system	  as	  it	  actively	  samples	  the	  visual	  array	  to	  procure	  information	  (Ballard,	  1991).	  Since	  many	  mechanisms	  actively	  engage	  their	  environment	  as	  they	  operate,	  it	  is	  important	  to	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capture	  these	  interactions	  in	  characterizing	  the	  phenomenon	  itself.	  Otherwise,	  researchers	  end	  up	  trying	  to	  explain	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  does	  not	  actually	  occur	  and	  may	  require	  resources	  that	  are	  not	  available	  in	  the	  mechanism.	  This	  concern	  is	  what	  lay	  behind	  calls	  for	  ecological	  validity	  in	  psychology	  research	  by	  Brunswik	  (1943),	  J.	  J.	  Gibson	  (1979),	  Neisser	  (1976),	  and	  others.	  (We	  discuss	  Gibson	  and	  Marr’s	  response	  to	  Gibson	  further	  in	  the	  following	  section.)	  	  In	  this	  section	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  two	  important	  insights	  that	  can	  be	  gleaned	  for	  the	  task	  of	  delineating	  phenomena	  for	  mechanistic	  explanation.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  phenomena	  are	  typically	  characterized	  not	  just	  qualitatively,	  as	  they	  typically	  are	  in	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  new	  mechanistic	  philosophers	  of	  science,	  but	  also	  in	  quantitative	  or	  formal	  terms	  (for	  recent	  exceptions,	  see	  Bechtel,	  2013;	  Bechtel	  &	  Abrahamsen,	  2010;	  Brigandt,	  2013;	  Kaplan,	  2011).	  In	  describing	  the	  talk	  of	  edge	  detection	  in	  his	  CL	  account,	  Marr	  identified	  the	  mathematical	  function	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  computed.	  Second,	  in	  delineating	  phenomena	  researchers	  often,	  as	  Marr	  did	  at	  the	  CL	  level,	  focus	  outwards	  on	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  mechanism	  operates.	  Among	  other	  things,	  this	  allows	  researchers	  to	  identify	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  mechanism	  in	  producing	  the	  phenomenon.	  We	  will	  return	  to	  show	  how	  Marr’s	  account	  generalizes	  to	  other	  phenomena	  beyond	  vision	  in	  the	  concluding	  section,	  but	  first	  point	  to	  two	  limitations	  of	  the	  account	  Marr	  offered.	  
	  
5.	  Delineating	  Phenomena:	  Going	  Beyond	  Marr’s	  Account	  of	  CL	  	  As	  much	  as	  Marr	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  developing	  an	  analysis	  of	  CL	  that	  showed	  both	  quantitative	  rigor	  and	  addressed	  the	  context	  in	  the	  world	  in	  which	  the	  visual	  mechanism	  operated,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  he	  did	  not	  develop	  two	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  CL	  account	  that	  are	  critical	  in	  delineating	  phenomena—that	  empirical,	  even	  experimental,	  research	  is	  required	  to	  identify	  the	  quantitative	  relations	  that	  constitute	  the	  phenomena	  and	  that	  characterizations	  of	  phenomena	  are	  often	  revised	  in	  the	  course	  of	  developing	  mechanistic	  explanations	  of	  them.	  	  	  
5.1.	  Empirical	  Inquiry	  to	  Delineate	  Phenomena	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  Despite	  the	  attention	  Marr	  paid	  to	  CL,	  he	  pursued	  CL	  accounts	  with	  an	  intuitive,	  almost	  arm-­‐chair	  approach.	  Poggio	  (1981),	  in	  articulating	  and	  defending	  Marr’s	  approach	  and	  bringing	  out	  clearly	  how	  CL	  analysis	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  world	  outside	  the	  visual	  systems,	  nonetheless	  also	  claims:	  “No	  high-­‐level	  specific	  preunderstanding	  is	  required,	  but	  only	  general	  knowledge	  about	  the	  physical	  world.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  general	  knowledge	  is	  that	  the	  world	  is	  constituted	  mainly	  of	  solid,	  non-­‐deformable	  objects	  of	  which	  only	  one	  can	  occupy	  a	  given	  point	  in	  space	  and	  time.”	  (p.	  259).	  He	  also	  notes	  “It	  is	  probably	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  most	  physiologists	  and	  students	  of	  psychophysics	  have	  often	  approached	  a	  specific	  problem	  in	  visual	  perception	  with	  their	  personal	  'computational'	  prejudices	  about	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  system	  and	  why	  it	  does	  what	  it	  does.”	  This	  almost	  trivializes	  the	  importance	  of	  CL	  analysis.	  But	  we	  contend	  that	  Marr	  did,	  or	  should	  have,	  intended	  something	  more	  radical.	  	  We	  take	  a	  cue	  as	  to	  what	  CL	  analysis	  ought	  to	  involve	  from	  Gibson,	  of	  whom	  Marr	  said:	  “In	  perception,	  perhaps	  the	  nearest	  anyone	  came	  to	  the	  level	  of	  computational	  theory	  was	  Gibson.”	  (1982,	  p.	  29).	  The	  basis	  for	  this	  comment	  is	  that	  Gibson	  more	  than	  most	  psychologists	  took	  seriously	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  perception	  occurs.	  Although	  he	  adopted	  the	  biological	  term	  ecological,	  his	  principle	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  physical	  features	  of	  the	  environment	  (specifically,	  those	  physical	  features	  about	  which	  information	  is	  available	  in	  the	  light).	  Much	  of	  Marr’s	  discussion	  of	  Gibson	  is	  critical,	  focusing	  on	  Gibson’s	  repudiation	  of	  representations	  and	  internal	  processing	  (Gibson	  claimed	  that	  vision	  was	  direct—we	  directly	  see	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  by	  picking	  up	  information	  available	  in	  the	  light).	  At	  the	  same	  period	  as	  Marr	  was	  writing	  Vision,	  Ullman	  published	  a	  detailed	  criticism	  of	  Gibson’s	  account	  of	  direct	  perception	  (Ullman,	  1980).	  We	  focus,	  however,	  on	  why	  Marr	  saw	  Gibson	  as	  the	  person	  who	  came	  closest	  to	  offering	  a	  computational	  theory.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Gibson	  would	  have	  bristled	  at	  being	  associated	  with	  anything	  called	  a	  
computational	  theory	  and	  even	  more	  to	  Marr’s	  advocacy	  of	  analyzing	  vision	  in	  terms	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  What	  an	  ecological	  approach	  to	  perception	  meant	  for	  Gibson	  and	  many	  who	  have	  subsequently	  pursued	  his	  project	  is	  that	  psychologists	  should	  study	  the	  perceiving	  organism	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  it	  functions,	  considering	  both	  what	  the	  organism	  uses	  vision	  for	  and	  the	  resources	  the	  world	  provides	  for	  performing	  those	  tasks.	  Both	  require	  empirical	  inquiry.	  Studying	  perceiving	  organisms	  reveals	  that	  they	  use	  vision	  to	  accomplish	  biological	  needs—detect	  resources	  and	  threats	  in	  their	  environments	  and	  safely	  navigate	  through	  it.	  Often	  these	  tasks	  can	  be	  performed	  by	  picking	  up	  on	  information	  in	  the	  environment	  without	  having	  to	  build	  up	  a	  complete	  representation	  of	  the	  world	  (by	  converting	  2D	  representations	  into	  3D	  representations).12	  	  Gibson	  referred	  to	  what	  an	  organism	  picks	  up	  through	  vision	  or	  other	  senses	  as	  affordances:	  “The	  affordances	  of	  the	  environment	  are	  what	  it	  offers	  the	  animal,	  what	  it	  provides	  or	  furnishes,	  either	  for	  good	  or	  ill”	  (J.	  J.	  Gibson,	  1979).	  In	  particular,	  they	  are	  possibilities	  for	  action	  in	  the	  world	  that	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  organism	  and	  its	  capacities	  for	  acting.	  An	  example	  he	  used	  is	  that	  a	  surface	  that	  is	  nearly	  horizontal	  and	  flat,	  sufficiently	  extended,	  rigid	  relative	  to	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  animal,	  affords	  support	  that	  can	  be	  walked	  or	  run	  on.	  Moreover,	  he	  stressed	  that	  these	  potentials	  exist	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  organism	  has	  learned	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  them.	  (Gibson	  was	  a	  pioneer	  in	  treating	  perception	  as	  a	  skill	  to	  be	  learned;	  see	  J.	  J.	  Gibson	  &	  Gibson,	  1955.	  ;	  This	  topic	  that	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  Eleanor	  Gibson's	  research;	  see	  E.	  J.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  algorithms.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  view	  Gibson’s	  arguments	  for	  direct	  perception	  and	  his	  eschewal	  of	  internal	  processing	  as	  methodological—as	  a	  strategy	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  richness	  of	  what	  he	  called	  “information	  in	  the	  light”	  that	  was	  neglected	  by	  most	  psychologists	  who	  jumped	  too	  quickly	  to	  address	  how	  organisms	  process	  stimuli	  that	  they	  have	  designed	  to	  probe	  the	  visual	  system	  with	  less	  attention	  to	  how	  such	  stimuli	  reflect	  the	  inputs	  the	  visual	  system	  typically	  confronts.	  In	  this	  he	  is	  allied	  with	  Marr’s	  contention	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  CL	  analysis.	  12	  Such	  inquiry	  has	  been	  pursued	  subsequently	  by,	  for	  example,	  Turvey	  (1992).	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Gibson,	  1969.)	  When	  the	  objects	  of	  vision	  are	  other	  agents,	  vision	  captures	  emotional	  information	  and	  presents	  others	  as	  entities	  to	  engage,	  fight,	  flee	  from,	  etc.	  Gibson	  maintained	  that	  these	  affordances	  were	  not	  in	  the	  organism	  but	  in	  the	  world,	  although	  they	  might	  only	  be	  relevant	  to	  organisms	  with	  particular	  capacities	  for	  action	  and	  so	  “picked	  up”	  by	  them.	  	  	  In	  identifying	  affordances	  the	  perceiver	  is	  typically	  not	  passive	  but	  moves	  about	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  even	  when	  not	  moving	  physically,	  moves	  its	  eyes	  to	  focus	  on	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  visual	  field.	  As	  we	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  once	  one	  recognizes	  that	  perceivers	  move	  to	  acquire	  information,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  characterize	  the	  input	  they	  use	  when	  functioning	  in	  their	  environment	  in	  terms	  of	  retinal	  images.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  Gibson	  termed	  the	  “optic	  array”—the	  pattern	  found	  in	  the	  light	  that	  changes	  as	  either	  the	  perceiver	  changes	  vantage	  points	  or	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  move.	  Among	  other	  things,	  the	  optic	  array	  provides	  information	  as	  to	  how	  the	  perceiver	  and	  perceived	  objects	  are	  situated	  vis-­‐á-­‐vis	  each	  other.	  	  	  Gibson	  initiated	  a	  research	  program	  that	  has	  provided	  substantial	  information	  about	  the	  information	  in	  the	  optic	  array.	  Lee	  and	  Reddish	  (1981),	  for	  example	  showed	  that	  a	  parameter	  τ,	  easily	  calculated	  from	  the	  rate	  of	  expansion	  in	  the	  optic	  array,	  specifies	  time	  to	  impact	  even	  for	  accelerating	  agents	  such	  as	  gannets	  diving	  into	  the	  ocean.	  By	  experimentally	  manipulating	  the	  size	  of	  doorways,	  Warren	  and	  Whang	  (1987)	  showed	  that	  the	  optic	  array	  carried	  information	  about	  whether	  a	  person	  could	  simply	  walk	  through	  or	  whether	  they	  would	  have	  to	  turn	  sideways.	  An	  important	  offshoot	  of	  Gibson’s	  research	  are	  investigations	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Findlay	  and	  Gilchrist	  (2003)	  into	  how	  agents	  determine	  appropriate	  eye	  movements	  (saccades)	  to	  secure	  useful	  information.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  information	  processing	  involved	  in	  vision,	  these	  inquiries	  are	  all	  CL	  inquiries.	  But,	  contrary	  to	  Poggio,	  they	  reveal	  information	  about	  how	  the	  visual	  system	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  body	  and	  world	  that	  was	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not	  part	  of	  general	  knowledge	  but	  stemmed	  from	  empirical	  investigations.	  Although	  we	  have	  not	  emphasized	  it,	  the	  results	  of	  these	  inquiries	  into	  the	  world	  in	  which	  vision	  operates	  can	  be	  stated	  in	  a	  precise,	  quantitative	  manner.	  	  	  	  
5.2.	  Reconstituting	  Computational	  Level	  Accounts	  
	  A	  standard	  picture	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  is	  that	  researchers	  begin	  with	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  such	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  and	  their	  efforts	  are	  then	  directed	  at	  solving	  the	  problem	  or	  explaining	  the	  phenomenon.	  But	  as	  we	  are	  all	  aware,	  attempts	  at	  solving	  a	  problem	  often	  leads	  to	  recognition	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  somewhat	  different	  from	  what	  it	  was	  initially	  taken	  to	  be.	  Likewise,	  efforts	  at	  explaining	  a	  phenomenon	  by	  studying	  the	  mechanism	  can	  lead	  scientists	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  different	  than	  they	  took	  it	  to	  be	  (Craver,	  2007,	  p.	  261).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  developments	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  vision	  since	  Marr	  has	  been	  the	  discovery	  that	  there	  are	  two	  streams	  of	  visual	  processing	  beyond	  V1:	  the	  ventral	  stream	  projects	  to	  areas	  in	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  while	  the	  dorsal	  stream	  projects	  to	  areas	  in	  the	  parietal	  lobe.	  In	  their	  paper	  identifying	  these	  pathways,	  Mishkin,	  Ungerleider,	  and	  Macko	  (1983)	  characterized	  them	  as	  involved	  in	  respectively	  determining	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  object	  and	  its	  location.	  Subsequently,	  Milner	  and	  Goodale	  (1995)	  offered	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  dorsal	  stream	  serves	  to	  identify	  possibilities	  for	  action.	  These	  two	  streams,	  however,	  are	  not	  fully	  independent	  as	  there	  are	  connections	  at	  several	  points	  between	  them	  (van	  Essen	  &	  Gallant,	  1994)	  and,	  as	  Findlay	  and	  Gilchrist	  (2003,	  Chapter	  1)	  discuss,	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  frontal	  eye	  fields,	  critical	  in	  regulating	  saccades,	  receives	  inputs	  from	  both.	  These	  discoveries	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  components	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  vision	  that	  were	  not	  differentiated	  prior	  to	  research	  on	  the	  responsible	  mechanism.	  	  Even	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  object	  recognition	  process	  on	  which	  Marr	  focused	  has	  been	  significantly	  revised	  in	  recent	  years.	  Although	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  as	  many	  and	  likely	  many	  more	  recurrent	  as	  feed-­‐forward	  projection	  through	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cortex	  has	  been	  known	  since	  the	  pioneering	  research	  of	  Lorente	  de	  Nó	  (1938),	  there	  was	  little	  understanding	  of	  what	  function	  these	  might	  serve.	  References	  to	  top-­‐down	  processing	  were	  frequent,	  especially	  in	  cognitive	  science,	  during	  the	  period	  in	  which	  Marr	  was	  working,	  but	  he	  was	  highly	  skeptical	  of	  them	  since	  they	  seemed	  incompatible	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  often	  see	  what	  we	  don’t	  expect	  to	  see.	  But	  evidence	  of	  the	  prevalence	  of	  recurrent	  activity	  in	  the	  brain	  has	  continued	  to	  grow	  and	  recently	  a	  number	  of	  researchers	  have	  developed	  accounts	  that	  accommodate	  it	  (Dayan,	  Hinton,	  Neal,	  &	  Zemel,	  1995;	  Rao	  &	  Ballard,	  1999;	  Llinás,	  2001;	  Hawkins	  &	  Blakeslee,	  2004;	  Hohwy,	  Roepstorff,	  &	  Friston,	  2008;	  Huang	  &	  Rao,	  2011;	  Clark,	  in	  press).	  They	  have	  recast	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  vision	  as	  starting	  with	  the	  brain	  predicting	  what	  it	  will	  next	  encounter	  through	  its	  senses	  and	  only	  engaging	  in	  further	  processing	  of	  input	  information	  when	  it	  contravenes	  what	  it	  predicted.	  Through	  the	  combination	  of	  empirical	  and	  conceptual	  research,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  vision	  on	  which	  Marr	  focused	  is	  being	  reconstituted.	  	  	  Marr	  was	  right	  to	  emphasize	  both	  the	  what	  and	  why	  elements	  of	  CL,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  exploring	  how	  these	  are	  to	  be	  identified.	  Empirical	  investigations	  conducted	  at	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  mechanism	  engages	  its	  environment	  are	  required	  to	  determine	  what	  are	  the	  stimuli	  to	  which	  the	  perceiver	  is	  responding	  and,	  although	  we	  have	  not	  addressed	  it,	  the	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  perceiver	  puts	  the	  information.	  Moreover,	  the	  CL	  account	  is	  not	  final	  when	  investigation	  of	  the	  mechanism	  begins	  but	  often	  must	  be	  revised	  in	  light	  of	  what	  is	  discovered	  by	  the	  mechanism	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  	  Our	  goal	  in	  this	  paper	  has	  been	  to	  develop	  a	  characterization	  of	  CL	  that	  is	  more	  adequate	  to	  Marr’s	  insistence	  that	  it	  involves	  both	  a	  what	  and	  a	  why	  aspect	  than	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extant	  interpretations.	  The	  what	  aspect	  requires	  developing	  a	  mathematical	  description	  of	  the	  task	  for	  vision.	  The	  why	  aspect	  forces	  researchers	  to	  look	  to	  the	  structures	  in	  the	  world	  that	  the	  organism	  engages	  through	  its	  visual	  system.	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  function	  computed	  by	  the	  visual	  system	  is	  effective	  because	  it	  matches	  a	  mathematical	  relation	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  world	  (e.g.,	  between	  light	  intensities	  and	  physical	  edges).	  We	  argued,	  however,	  that	  Marr	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  either	  in	  recognizing	  that	  empirical	  inquiry	  such	  as	  Gibson	  pursued	  is	  often	  required	  to	  identify	  the	  task	  confronted	  by	  the	  visual	  system	  or	  that	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  task	  must	  often	  be	  revised	  as	  research	  on	  the	  mechanism	  proceeds.	  The	  CL	  analysis,	  so	  construed,	  identifies	  the	  phenomena	  of	  vision—the	  visual	  system	  processes	  information	  provided	  by	  light	  so	  as	  to	  compute	  functions	  that	  correspond	  to	  those	  realized	  in	  the	  physical	  world,	  thereby	  enabling	  organisms	  to	  perform	  their	  activities.	  	  	  Following	  Marr,	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  visual	  system	  and	  thus	  discussed	  CL	  analyses	  of	  visual	  information	  available	  to	  organisms.	  But	  as	  we	  indicated	  at	  the	  outset,	  this	  perspective	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  brain	  systems.	  The	  most	  straightforward	  extensions	  are	  to	  other	  sensory	  systems	  and	  motor	  systems	  that	  compute	  functions	  that	  relate	  directly	  to	  structures	  in	  the	  environment.	  Motor	  systems	  must	  compute	  commands	  that	  enable	  the	  body	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  environment,	  including	  changes	  in	  the	  environment	  that	  result	  from	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  motor	  processes.	  It	  is	  by	  looking	  to	  the	  environment	  that	  researchers	  can	  identify	  the	  function	  that	  the	  motor	  system	  must	  compute.	  A	  nice	  example	  involves	  the	  oculomotor	  system	  that	  controls	  eye	  movements.	  One	  of	  its	  tasks	  (performed	  by	  the	  vestibulo-­‐ocular	  reflex	  or	  VOR)	  is	  keeping	  the	  visual	  world	  stable	  on	  the	  retina	  when	  the	  head	  is	  moving.	  Experimental	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  system	  converts	  transient	  eye-­‐velocity-­‐encoded	  inputs	  into	  persistent	  eye-­‐position-­‐encoded	  outputs.	  It	  was	  thus	  concluded	  that	  the	  system	  network	  is	  a	  neural	  integrator.13	  In	  this	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  It	  is	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  neural	  integrator	  also	  serves	  for	  other	  eye-­‐movement	  operations	  such	  as	  saccadic	  and	  pursuit	  movements	  (Robinson,	  1989;	  Goldman,	  Kaneko,	  Major,	  Aksay,	  Tank,	  &	  Seung,	  2002).	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the	  researchers	  infer	  from	  contextual	  cues	  (“contextual	  constraint”)	  that	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  encoded	  velocity	  and	  position	  are	  that	  of	  integration	  to	  the	  claim	  mathematical	  integration	  is	  what	  is	  computed	  (Shagrir,	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  The	  challenge	  in	  characterizing	  CL	  analysis	  is	  somewhat	  greater	  for	  more	  central	  cognitive	  activities	  such	  as	  episodic	  memory.	  Following	  Ebbinghaus,	  memory	  has	  often	  been	  studied	  using	  laboratory	  tasks	  such	  as	  learning	  lists	  of	  words	  that	  are	  relatively	  far	  removed	  from	  those	  humans	  typically	  confront.	  Inspired	  by	  Gibson,	  researchers	  such	  as	  Neisser	  (1982;	  Neisser	  &	  Winograd,	  1988)	  investigated	  real	  stimuli	  and	  real	  tasks	  (e.g.,	  providing	  testimony	  in	  legal	  proceedings).	  One	  of	  the	  upshots	  of	  this	  endeavor	  was	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  reconstructive	  memory	  is	  (a	  claim	  that	  has	  been	  pursued	  by	  other	  researchers	  as	  well;	  see,	  e.g.,	  Schacter,	  1996).	  What	  makes	  it	  reconstructive	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  recall,	  pieces	  of	  information	  that	  are	  retrieved	  are	  organized	  together	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  at	  least	  partly	  responsive	  to	  the	  context	  in	  which	  retrieval	  is	  required.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  retrieval	  context	  as	  partly	  shaping	  the	  task	  of	  memory	  recall.	  It	  is	  much	  more	  challenging	  to	  characterize	  memory	  retrieval	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  mathematical	  function,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  research	  on	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  episodic	  memory	  is	  less	  advanced	  than	  the	  research	  on	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  vision.	  	  The	  information	  processing	  perspective	  applies	  more	  generally	  than	  just	  to	  brain	  function.	  	  Biological	  systems	  often	  employ	  systems	  that	  control	  other	  systems.	  At	  the	  cellular	  level,	  this	  is	  carried	  out	  chemically	  through	  cell	  signaling	  system.	  In	  single-­‐celled	  organisms,	  which	  are	  the	  most	  prevalent	  life	  forms	  on	  the	  planet,	  molecular	  systems	  pick	  up	  information	  about	  the	  internal	  state	  or	  conditions	  in	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  cell,	  and	  regulate	  such	  activities	  as	  the	  synthesis	  of	  new	  proteins.	  In	  characterizing	  these	  phenomena,	  both	  the	  what	  and	  why	  aspects	  of	  Marr’s	  CL	  level	  are	  appropriate:	  researchers	  both	  specify	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  signal	  picked	  up	  and	  the	  response	  generated	  mathematically,	  and	  relate	  this	  to	  conditions	  external	  to	  the	  control	  system.	  This	  outward	  focus	  is	  important,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  
	   32	  
vision,	  to	  specifying	  which	  mathematical	  relations	  constitute	  the	  phenomena	  to	  be	  explained	  and	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  system	  in	  generating	  the	  phenomena.	  	  We	  have	  limited	  our	  discussion	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  information	  processing	  contexts.	  	  But	  we	  think	  that	  Marr’s	  account	  of	  CL	  provides	  insights	  into	  the	  tasks	  confronted	  in	  delineating	  phenomena	  and	  can	  help	  fill	  a	  lacuna	  in	  the	  accounts	  the	  new	  mechanists	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  have	  offered	  of	  the	  task	  of	  delineating	  phenomena.	  For	  example,	  mechanistic	  explanations	  are	  also	  advanced	  for	  phenomena	  such	  as	  protein	  synthesis	  and	  the	  generation	  of	  action	  potentials	  that	  do	  not	  themselves	  serve	  to	  process	  information.	  Developing	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  phenomena	  and	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  are	  performed	  is	  also	  vitally	  important	  in	  those	  endeavors.	  Hence,	  some	  of	  the	  lessons	  derived	  from	  the	  CL	  analysis	  may	  extend	  to	  these	  explanations.	  However,	  since	  these	  explanations	  do	  not	  involve	  processing	  information,	  the	  distinctive	  why	  feature	  of	  CL	  analysis	  which	  we	  have	  emphasized	  does	  not	  apply.	  Our	  contention	  is	  that	  Marr’s	  valuable	  insight	  is	  that	  with	  information	  processing	  mechanisms,	  the	  CL	  level	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  identifying	  the	  relation	  in	  the	  world	  that	  the	  information	  processing	  system	  must	  compute	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  without	  a	  CL	  analysis,	  the	  quest	  for	  mechanism	  would	  be	  impaired	  and	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  would	  be	  unavailable.	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